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Bulgarian Foreign Policy on the Middle Eastern Deadlock at the End of the 1960s and Early 1970s

Bulgarian Foreign Policy on the Middle Eastern Deadlock at the End of the 1960s and Early 1970s

Nadya FILIPOVA

When in the late 1950s the new Bulgarian government managed to make a breakthrough in its foreign policy relations and established promising contacts with the governments of Egypt and Syria, its hopes were raised by the powerful anti-colonial potential of the Arab nationalist movements. In the middle of the following decade the Bulgarian diplomacy defined the undercurrent of exploiting the Palestinian problem and the inherited desire to abolish the Jewish state in Palestine cherished by the friendly governments in Cairo, Damascus and Bagdad as leadership ambitions for winning the title “champion of the Arab cause”. [1] The turbulence of 1967 opened up an opportunity for Sofia to deepen the Arab interest and dependence, but also posed a threat that the Arab aspirations to solve the Palestinian problem and regain the occupied by Israel new Arab territories might undermine the achieved cooperation. Sustaining the Middle Eastern deadlock turned out to be a convenient means for keeping the Arab partners within a certain framework of equal distance from the West and from their impatience to find a solution to the conflict with Israel. During the same period the opportunities for exerting influence were channeled through contacts with Egypt, Syria, Iraq and some Palestinian organizations. Unlike the Soviet global approach, the Bulgarian diplomatic actions stemmed from the ambition to expand the economic relations with the Arab countries. Among other economic initiatives, getting involved in the thriving arms trade in the region was supposed to financially stimulate the strategic economic plans of the communist regime in Sofia.

The Road to the Supposed Mutual Poly-Dependence : Developing Ideological Framework and Pragmatic Approach in the Years of “Acquaintance”

The arms deal with Egypt made through Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1955 marked Khrushchev’s perseverance to take the chance that comes once. The Soviet Union entered the Middle East. In Moscow it was seen as a move with a great strategic importance – the region bordered the southern flank of the Soviet bloc. [2] Overwhelmed by internal political and economic troubles, lack of financial and economic resources and the havoc in the Eastern bloc provoked by the first timid attempt to remedy the communist political and economic structure, the new Kremlin’s rulers used the opportunity to dramatically alter the Soviet policy concerning those who Stalin’s propaganda accused of being “lackeys of the West”. [3]
Designed on ideological principles, the USSR needed ideological base for its modified foreign policy approach to the newly independent Third World countries. The changed ideological frames also had to direct the Eastern European satellites, which were granted some freedom.

At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev officially revised the policy towards ideologies such as Nasserism, Ba’athism and Gandhism, [4] defining them as national liberation movements. Khrushchev pointed out their major characteristic : the anti-Western trend. Unfolding his analysis, he confirmed the Marxist dogma that all nations would reach the socialist final. Alongside their anti-Western potential, Khrushchev emphasized the socialist one, [5] but didn’t mention the nationalist background of which Stalin had warned. This miscalculation led to the ensuing permanent necessity to reformulate the communist ideological validity.

The economic program of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was even more enfeebled. In 1956-1957 the Soviet bloc set schematic directives whose main purpose was to gradually replace the Western economic influence in the Third World. [6]

At the beginning, the Bulgarian economic initiatives in the late 1950s found a convenient vehicle in the new Soviet global approach. In the time of a series of changes within the Comecon space, Sofia strived to continue changing the economic and social structure of the country and tried to secure and further the Bulgarian industrialization. [7] In an attempt to avoid the unattainable markets not only of the West, but also of Comecon, Sofia repeatedly stated the interest of the country in the expansion of the relations with the countries from the Middle East. The region was defined as a promising and strategic partner due to its geographic closeness and the convenient sea route across the Mediterranean. The main vision was that Bulgarian industrial goods would be traded for raw materials and convertible currency from the Middle Eastern countries. [8]

In the same context the region was evaluated as a promising zone for the disposal of large amounts of arms. Sofia asked for permission to be included in this profitable trade with the Middle Eastern countries from the authorities of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact in 1958. [9] The first arms deliveries were made to Syria and the Algerian National Liberation Front at the beginning of the 1960s. [10]

However, the evidence of error in judgment emerged in that period. The necessity of rethinking the communist ideological approach towards the Third World was imposed by the friendly governments in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, demonstrating determination to follow their political goals. [11] By the end of Khrushchev’s era, the Soviet bloc had to abandon the ambition to direct the internal political development of the post-colonial states through the local communist parties.

The transformation in the Soviet flawed approach that took place with Brezhnev’s ascension to power was a real relief for the Bulgarian diplomacy. For its image as the most loyal Soviet satellite, Bulgaria had been punished with painful economic restrictions in the early 1960s. [12] That’s why Sofia warmly backed the pragmatism and the fresh communist formulations. At the meeting in September 1966, in the presence of the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, Brezhnev frankly stated that “in Africa, influential and populated countries like Egypt must be supported” and that the Soviet government didn’t intend to argue over the formulations and specifics of the so called “Arab socialism”. The newly elaborated definition glossing the communist ideological retreat was “non-capitalist path of development”. [13]

Pursuing the ambition of creating a subsystem of relations within the framework of the Soviet global interests, Todor Zhivkov became not only a Bulgarian but also a Soviet star in the relations with the Arab radical governments. He was able to listen to in obedience, to exert his natural ingenuity to talk in a particular way with the Arab leaders and to tell them what they expected to hear without clear promises.

Zhivkov was the first Eastern European leader to travel to Cairo after Khrushchev’s visit in 1964. In November 1965 he patiently listened to Nasser’s accusations of the Soviet bloc support for Israel. [14] He admitted the transformations in the communist foreign policy and recognized the Arab socialist model designed on the basis of the Arab national specifics and governed by the Arab nationalist political forces. [15]

In April 1966, Todor Zhivkov welcomed the radical Ba’athist government that had taken the power in Damascus just two months before. He promoted the Bulgarian experience in the creating of the National front of various leftist parties and wasn’t embarrassed to officially leave the main Marxist dogma of the leading role of the communist party. [16]
However, the peaceful and stable, from a Bulgarian point of view, Middle Eastern development in the years before 1967 did not result in the expected commitment, and the forms and volume of economic cooperation involving mainly trade in a limited number of agricultural goods reached their limit at a time when the needs in energy resources and raw materials for the industry in the countries of Comecon were increasing in an avalanche-like way. [17]

The offer for the missing stimulus for the progress in the bilateral economic relations came from the Arab capitals in 1965-1966. [18] The starting price that had to be paid was the cutting of the foreign economic and cultural relations with Israel. [19] In the context of the changing Middle Eastern developments in the mid-1960s Bulgaria strictly followed the USSR policy in which the main focus became the Arab-Israeli conflict. [20]

Sustaining of the Middle Eastern Deadlock – the Only Suitable Alternative : the Soviet Philosophy and the Bulgarian Support - Motives and Performance

During and immediately after the trials of the Six-Day War the Soviet bloc governments arrived at the conclusion that the changes brought about by the war could be beneficial for their political and economic goals. The war complications raised by a degree the dependence of the friendly frontline Arab states as regards food supplies and weapons as well as diplomatic mediation. [21]

However, the communist states clearly identified the threat of the deposition of G.A. Nasser in Egypt, the leftist Ba’athists in Syria and Arif’s regime in Baghdad, on whose anti-Western policy the partners from the Soviet bloc relied. [22] At the same time, the communist countries were unpleasantly surprised and even scared of the uncontrolled escalation of the June War and the danger of involving the Soviet bloc in it. [23] The problem was discussed at a special meeting of the Politburo of the Bulgarian communist party on 14th June 1967.

At the meeting Todor Zhivkov pointed to the nationalist ambitions of the Arab leaders as the major provocation for the military confrontation in the region and officially rejected the ambitions to abolish the state of Israel. In defence of the Soviet approach he accused the regimes in Damascus and Cairo of not sharing their plans and intentions with Moscow hence the socialist countries were just presented with a fait accompli when the Aqaba Gulf was closed. [24] On the other hand, he conveniently disregarded and did not discuss the concerns of the Bulgarian ambassador in Damascus from March 1966, which the latter voiced after his meeting with Dr. Makhos, the Syrian foreign minister, who was on an official visit to Bulgaria : “the Syrian leadership is practically preparing the waging of a war for the liberation of Palestine and this is not a matter of the distant future”. [25]

In June 1967, the leadership in Sofia arrived at the conclusion that there was an immediate danger for Bulgaria as the country was at a stone’s throw away from the region, just across the Mediterranean if the situation was considered in terms of an expanded conventional or nuclear conflict. [26] Todor Zhivkov and his clique were also concerned about the belligerent mood of some members of the Politburo, who, at the same meeting, called for military interference in the conflict on the part of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact in order to strengthen the positions of the Soviet bloc in the Middle East. [27]

On the basis of the above mentioned considerations about the situation regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the summer of 1967, the Soviet bloc developed political mechanisms for influencing the Middle Eastern processes. First of all, there was a necessity of putting in a lot of efforts so that the existing friendly regimes could retain power and their anti-Western character was stimulated. Secondly, it was important not to allow the Arab inclination towards confrontation to slip out of the control and mediation of the communist bloc by means of curbing the nationalist trend and if possible its reforming and dissolving in the socialist one.

The Bulgarian leadership believed that the support for the Soviet political approach would serve the Bulgarian economic ambitions. In view of the circumstances the goal was formulated as a necessity of increased sales of industrial goods and arms within the framework of the competition for raw materials and convertible currency inter alia with the Comecon countries. [28] Specifically to Sofia, on a further peaceful stage of stability in the region the supposed dependence would grow into a definite economic interest not only in the friendly countries, but in the rest of the Arab world. [29]

The change of power in Egypt and Syria in the autumn of 1970 clearly divided the Middle Eastern deadlock of the late 1960s and early 1970s into two phases.
Immediately after the Six-Day War, a Bulgarian official delegation visited the frontline countries, including Jordan and revolutionary Iraq, with a basket full of offers for assistance and ready programs for long-term economic commitment. They were accompanied by offers for providing additional credits in exchange for the purchase of Bulgarian industrial goods and light industry plants at favourable terms. [30] In the context of Bulgaria’s own weak financial capability, the concluded agreements proved the interest of Sofia in creating closer economic relationships with the Arab world, based on the upheld pro-Arab position.

The sales of weapons and ammunition went up as a result of the concluded long-term agreements with Syria, Egypt and Iraq at the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967. [31] After the war, the export of shoulder-launched missiles RPG-7 to the three countries was under way. The first agreement was signed with Syria in December 1967 ; [32] the agreement with Iraq dated from the next year. [33] Probably due to the War of Attrition, at the beginning of 1969, Egypt initiated negotiations and towards the end of the same year an agreement was signed. [34] The Bulgarian institutions considered the sales of this particular specification of weaponry the most promising, taking into consideration the nature of the military operations in the period after the Six-Day War.

In the late 1960s the Soviet bloc was quite suspicious towards the Palestinian resistance organizations. In this context, the Bulgarian authorities avoided official contacts, but kept in touch with the most influential among them such as Al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, As-Sa’iqa. [35] For confidential reasons the supply of arms for these organizations was under way by means of orders placed by the Syrian army. Limited quantities of arms for the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) were sold in November 1968. [36] In the middle of 1970, the delivery of Kalashnikov submachine guns for a newly founded organization by Arabian communist parties named “Guerrilla Forces” was approved by the Bulgarian leadership. The submachine guns given away to “Guerrilla Forces” comprised of 1/5 of the whole quantity of arms provided for “the support of the national liberation movements in the world”. [37] The military authority of “Guerrilla Forces” was supposed to facilitate the increase of their political influence on the Palestinian resistance.

As it was planned by Moscow, the arms supplies assisted the remaining in power of the friendly Arab regimes after the Six-Day War. The Soviet diplomats confirmed this strategy before their Bulgarian colleagues in December 1968 [38] and for Sofia it became a convenient means for serving both the Moscow political approach and the Bulgarian trade ambitions.

At the same time, in an attempt to foster the interest of the Arab radical regimes in closer contacts with the Soviet bloc, the Bulgarian diplomacy fed their fears of being deposed by Israel and the Western intelligence services due to the weak internal political support they had. Thus the regimes in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad were actively supported to set up or strengthen their organizational structures. During the meetings between government officials, party, youth and trade union organizations, Bulgarian best practices in the construction of socialism were shared and transferred. [39] This is how Sofia was trying to influence the development of the governments in Egypt, Syria and Iraq towards a deepening of the internal political, economic and social transformations. This, they believed in Sofia, would ensure the further distancing from the West as well as from the anti-Israeli trend in the governing philosophy of the Arab nationalist regimes. In view of the strong commitment of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the leftist Ba’athists in Syria to the anti-West policy in the region, the strengthening of these regimes hardened the Middle Eastern deadlock and served the Bulgarian aspirations. Thanks to the predictability of his internal and foreign policy steps, G.A. Nasser was defined as a partner of paramount importance in the framework of Bulgarian Middle Eastern partnerships. [40]

Considerably more maneuvering skills required the maintaining of a controlled level of confrontation in the region in the context of promoting a comprehensive political solution and selling weapons. The Soviet bloc attempt at mitigating the extreme nationalist trend in the Arab nationalist regimes through suggestions concerning the internal social, political and economic changes brought about certain results until the late 1960s.

However, the very fact that the radical Arab regimes were supplied with arms maintained a constant level of hostility and relentless determination. In addition, despite the peace rhetoric and the official denial of guerrilla raids over Israel as a means of solving the Palestinian problem, Bulgaria indirectly encouraged the Syrian strong unwillingness to compromise and the military actions of the Palestinian resistance organizations. During his visit to Syria in June 1969, the Bulgarian Minister of Defence demonstratively appeared at the armistice line with Israel. [41] In the course of unofficial talks Bulgarian Union leaders defined the people’s liberation war as a “natural right” of the Palestinian people as regards to the solution of the problem with Israel. [42] In view of the ostensible military superiority of Israel and the reluctance of the USA to exert influence over their strategic partner due to the strong Soviet presence in the Arab region, [43] the indirectly-supported-by Bulgaria hostility contributed to the blocking of the peace negotiations and the prolonging of the stalemate in the Middle East.

Extending this hypocritical policy, in June 1969 the Bulgarian foreign minister, in the presence of his Egyptian colleague stated that the Bulgarian leadership was aware that “the bigger the military power is, the more authoritative the political arguments of the United Arab Republic in the process of finding a way out of the crisis will be”. [44]

In Baghdad, which actively supported the Palestinian radical organizations, a Bulgarian general added that “when the peaceful means are exhausted, the main factor for sorting out the problems will be the military force”. [45]

At the same time, at the highest political level it was suggested that the Arabs should refrain from provoking large-scale military actions. In June 1969, in a conversation with the then Minister of Defence Hafez Al-Assad his Bulgarian colleague insisted that any military plans of the Arab countries had first to be coordinated with the Soviet bloc. [46]

Thanks to the Middle Eastern deadlock in the late 1960s, Bulgaria emerged as a relatively independent partner in the bilateral relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq and managed to engage the radical Arab regimes in active trade. The support of the Palestinian resistance organizations was aimed at keeping them within the sphere and if possible under the influence of the Soviet bloc as well as retaining the positive image of Bulgaria before the governments in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. The intersection of the mutual economic interests became the sales of Bulgarian arms in exchange for Arab oil, phosphates, cotton and convertible currency. [47] The Bulgarian diplomats, however, were convinced that the situation of “neither peace, nor war” could not last long and “with the overcoming of the Israeli aggression the sales of Bulgarian arms will drop”. [48] Therefore, Sofia was trying to establish long-lasting bilateral economic relationships independent of the current political situation in the region or the relationships within Comecon through the construction of joint industrial enterprises. In this respect, by the end of 1960s, bilateral agreements of considerable volume were signed, [49] based on the stability of the deadlock in the region.
In the changing Middle East situation in the early 1970s, the Soviet diplomacy continued maintaining the deadlock in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In spite of the incompatibility of such an approach with the growing impatience among the general public in the Arab world to do away with the consequences of the Six-Day War and to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, Moscow clearly defined it as the only acceptable alternative. As Leonid Brezhnev recognized during a meeting with Todor Zhivkov in September 1971, “it wouldn’t be bad if they [the Egyptians – author’s note] took a bit from the Israeli”, but they had to be certain about the success of a possible military action. [50] However, in Moscow, they believed that the opposite was more likely ; therefore, they suggested refraining from military initiatives. In order to contribute to the maintaining of the statu quo based on the Soviet model, Sofia used all its channels including the highest level.

The Arab partners gradually imposed a discussion on the possibilities of finding a way out of the Middle Eastern deadlock and this ran like a red thread through the bilateral relations with Bulgaria. Using Todor Zhivkov as a mediator in the contacts with the Soviet leadership, during the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1971, the Egyptian leaders expressed the deep dissatisfaction of Cairo with the situation “neither peace, nor war” and declared that the Egyptian people were anxious to rise in arms. [51] Todor Zhivkov answered with a rhetorical question hinting at his apparent doubt about the military preparation of the Arab armies : “In your opinion, are you prepared for a successful war with Israel ?”. [52]

During a special visit to Cairo and Damascus in February 1972, in personal conversations with A. Sadat and H. Al-Assad, Todor Zhivlov placed particular emphasis on the necessity of combining the preparation for a war with political means. [53] Developing this thesis, he added something inconsistent with the political situation : “now the main front is not the Israeli front, but the one inside the country” and it was necessary to bring to an end “the revolutionary changes”. [54] T. Zhivkov also tried to drive in a wedge between Egypt and Syria : at the meeting in Damascus he tried to arouse Assad’s suspicion about a possible separatist Egyptian-Israeli agreement through American mediation. [55]

At a time when the Soviet diplomacy was unable to bring about a positive change of the status quo for the Arab countries by using diplomatic means, Sofia had to go through the trial of having to provide arms supplies in huge quantities while curbing the escalation of the conflict. The necessity of purchasing more and more Bulgarian weapons that the Bulgarian diplomats “justified” by the imperative to reach high and effective level of arms equipment in order to achieve parity with Israel. [56]

Thanks to the Middle-East deadlock and the escalating preparation for a war, the sales of weaponry turned into a major and long-lasting Bulgarian export item for the radical Arab regimes. Within the framework of the deadlock, the relations with the Palestinian resistance organizations expanded and in February 1973 Yasser Arafat arrived in Sofia. [57] Although still unofficial, the direct contacts at a high level, to a certain extent, managed to balance the rising discontent with the socialist countries within the Arab countries and ensure supposed new long-term partnership with the Arab world.

In the spring of 1973, more and more often, the Bulgarian diplomats were forced to explain that with the furthering of the global Détente process, the Soviet bloc did not intend to sacrifice the Arab interests. [58] Sticking to the policy of maintaining the Middle Eastern deadlock was damaging to the Bulgarian image in the Arab world. In the Arab press and at closed party forums in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad and Tripoli, the socialist countries were accused of “Eastern” imperialism. [59] Achieved to a considerable extent through anti-Israeli rhetoric and arms sales, the interest in Bulgarian industrial goods and plants did not turn into a leading tendency in the bilateral relations with the Arab partners. [60]

For a peripheral communist country like Bulgaria, the Middle Eastern deadlock at the end of 1960s and early 1970s became one of a few opportunities to take political and economic advantages, which was a means for stabilizing the regime in Sofia. The attempt of the Bulgarian government and its Arab partners to diversify their foreign political and economic contacts and to build a subsystem of relationships within the framework of the global competition had a relative success limited by the pulsations of the cold war and the complicated aspects of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

[1] The Central State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria, Fond 1B, Inventory 6, Document 5896, p. 27. Hereafter CSA with the numbers of a fond, inventory and document.

[2] M. Vaïsse, Les relations internationales depuis 1945, 8e ed., citation on the Bulgarian translation, Sofia, Kama, 2004, p. 63 ; A. Vasilev, Russia in the Middle East : from messianism to pragmatism, Moscow, 1993, p. 34, 44.

[3] G. Golan, “The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, in N.J. Ashton (ed.), The Cold War in the Middle East. Regional conflict and the superpowers 1967-1973, London/New York, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007, p. 60 ; P. Sluglett, “The Cold War in the Middle East”, in L. Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 52.

[4] A. Vasilev, Russia in the Middle East…, op. cit., p. 29.

[5] N. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress [in Russian], Moscow, 1956, p. 25-30.

[6] G. Nikova, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Bulgaria [in Bulgarian], Sofia, 1989, p. 242-249.

[7] I. Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, the Road to Power. Policy and Economy in Bulgaria, 1953-1964 [in Bulgarian], Sofia, 2000, p. 94-100.

[8] The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria – hereafter DA-MFA–, Inventory 14secret – hereafter 14s–, Document 650, p. 51 ; N. Filipova, “The Problems of the Economic Relations of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria with the Arab World until 1967 in the Analyses of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations” [in Bulgarian], Bulletin of the Bulgarian Historical Society, vol. 41, 2011, p. 464-465.

[9] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 64, Doc. 258, p. 1-4.

[10] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 64, Doc. 294, p. 11-12 ; I. Grigorova, The Bulgarian-French Relations in the Time of the Presidency of Général de Gaulle,1958-1969 [in Bulgarian], Sofia, Albatros, 2009, p. 99-101.

[11] A. Vasilev, Russia in the Middle East…, op. cit., p. 60, 63-64 ; Ch. McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations, London, Central-Asian Research Center, 1973, p. 55 ; M. Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, Quarter books, 1981, p. 15.

[12] N. Filipova, The Bulgarian Diplomacy in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the Age of the Cold War, the Middle of the 1950s-the Middle of the 1970s [in Bulgarian], Sofia, Legal Advice, 2008, p. 89-96, 106.

[13] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 34, Doc. 43, p. 39-40.

[14] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 34, Doc. 21, p. 9-13.

[15] Ibid., p. 147-149 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3027, p. 9-13.

[16] DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1970, p. 51-52, p. 74 ; C. Tsonev, Faces from the Large Portraits [in Bulgarian], Sofia, Trud, 2005, p. 51-52.

[17] N. Filipova, The Bulgarian Diplomacy…, op. cit., p. 135-136, 138-143, 155-158.

[18] DA-MFA, Inv. 21, Doc. 3027, p. 19 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1970, p. 77-79.

[19] DA-MFA, Inv. 22, Doc. 3175, p.1, DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1077, p. 1 ; CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 6, p. 23-27.

[20] The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, America in the Age of the Soviet Power, 1945-1991, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993, p. 192 ; A. Vasilev, Russia in the Middle East…, op. cit., p. 84.

[21] G. Golan, “The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude…”, op. cit., p. 61 ; F. Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations. Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005, 8th printing 2011, p. 116.

[22] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 34, Doc. 59, p. 6-7, Rabotnichesko Delo newspaper, Year XLI, N 163, 12 June 1967 : The Speech of the Bulgarian UN Ambassador before the UN Security Council, 10th June 1967.

[23] G. Golan, “The Cold War and the Soviet Attitude…”, op. cit., p. 60-61.

[24] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 34, Doc. 59, p. 2-3.

[25] DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1970, p. 80.

[26] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 34, Doc. 59, p. 28-29.

[27] Ibid., p. 15-18.

[28] DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 3757, p. 13 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 3618, p. 55 ; CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 117, p. 202-203.

[29] DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 3618, p. 55.

[30] DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1966, p. 2-4, 10 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 3618, p. 55 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 3450, p. 4 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 3093, p. 7 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1311, p. 182.

[31] DA-MFA, Inv. 22, Doc. 3652, p. 62-64 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 22, Doc. 3201, p. 42 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 22, Doc. 1363, p. 26 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 1455, p. 63-64 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 23, Doc. 1278, p. 1-2.

[32] DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 229, p. 4-5 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 688, p. 10.

[33] DA-MFA, Inv. 20s, Doc. 688, p. 10.

[34] DA-MFA, Inv. 20s, Doc. 229, p. 5.

[35] Non-processed Archives of the Bulgarian Communist Party, F. 1B, Inv. 81 : The Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1967-1990) : “Reports by the Head of the Department to the Secretariat of the BCP, 25th September 1974 and 4th October 1974”, p. 2, 7 ; “Report concerning the Palestinian Liberation movement and the Bulgarian attitude towards it”, 1974, p. 12-16.

[36] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 64, Doc. 378, p. 1-3.

[37] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 64, Doc. 398, p. 1-7.

[38] DA-MFA, Inv. 20s, Doc. 419, p. 98.

[39] N. Filipova, The Bulgarian Diplomacy…, op. cit., p.193-196, 217-218, 267-276.

[40] DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 975, p. 1, 13-14 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 351, p. 76 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 860, p. 6-7.

[41] DA-MFA, Inv. 20s, Doc. 403, p. 174-175, 181.

[42] DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 2286, p. 163.

[43] H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, A Touchstone Book Simon & Schuster, 1994, citation on the Bulgarian translation, Sofia, Trud, 1997, p. 647-648 ; H. Kissinger, Crisis. The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crisis, New York, A Touchstone Book Simon & Schuster, 2003, citation on the Bulgarian translation, Sofia, Trud, 2004, p. 14-15.

[44] DA-MFA, Inv. 20, Doc. 675, p. 29.

[45] DA-MFA, Inv. 22s, Doc. 140, p. 32.

[46] DA-MFA, Inv. 20s, Doc. 403, p. 185-186.

[47] N. Filipova, The Bulgarian Diplomacy…, op. cit., p. 202-213, 222-229, 278-283.

[48] DA-MFA, Inv. 21s, Doc. 354, p. 51.

[49] DA-MFA, Inv. 22s, Doc. 228, p. 65 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 2264, p. 34, 63 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 2289, p. 2-4 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 24, Doc. 2265, p. 20 ; CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 345, p. 18 ; CSA, F. 259, Inv. 18, Doc. 347, p. 10.

[50] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 60, Doc. 83, p. 13.

[51] DA-MFA, Inv. 22s, Doc. 227, p. 140.

[52] Ibid., p. 142.

[53] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 58, Doc. 65, p. 232.

[54] Ibid., p. 236.

[55] Ibid., 237 ; CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 2845, p. 14.

[56] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 58, Doc. 65, p. 232.

[57] Non-processed Archives of the Bulgarian Communist Party, F. 1B, Inv. 81 : The Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1967-1990) : “Y. Arafat’s Meeting in the National Council of the Bulgarian National Front, 14th February 1973”.

[58] CSA, F. 1B, Inv. 60, p. 23, 38 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 25s, Doc. 138, p. 11.

[59] M. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, The New York Times Book Co., 1975, p. 164 ; DA-MFA, Inv. 29, p. 2, 23.

[60] N. Filipova, The Bulgarian Diplomacy…, op. cit., p. 246-247 ; 260-262.


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